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"The Regulatory Grass is Greener":
A Comparative Analysis of the
Alien Tort Claims Act and the European Union's
Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility
JOSHUA M. CHANIN*
INTRODUCTION
Google.com, the ultramodern measuring stick for social and political cur-
rency, lists some 17.6 million results for a search on "globalization."' Front pages
and op-ed pieces from major international newspapers speak to the impact of
globalization almost weekly, if not daily.2 The influence and relevance of the
phenomenon are unquestioned, as is the diversity of opinion on the nature of its
impact. In simple terms, globalization is the continued integration of economies
and societies. Individual state perspectives, governments, and boundaries have
ceded to multilateral organizations, global economic and political regimes, and
international markets. But is the shift from a state-based society to a global soci-
ety really at the heart of the issue? Is that what activists are fighting against on
the streets of Seattle and Genoa? Is that what technocrats and corporate execu-
tives consistently praise? The answer is not clear, for the notion of globalization
is so broad, so nebulous, that it is indeed possible to find credible evidence to sup-
port conflicting sides of the same argument. In order to gain insight into global-
ization, one must break the concept down into distinct building blocks, and
evaluate each one individually. Along these lines, this Note attempts to evaluate
the impact of multinational corporations (MNCs) on worldwide human rights
*J.D./M.PA. candidate, May 2006, Indiana University-Bloomington. I would like to thank
Professor Hannah Buxbaum, Professor John Karaagac, Carmen Brun, Joanna Sharp, Brandon
Moersch, and the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies staff for their generosity, expertise, and
insight. I would also like to thank my parents, John and Johann, and my sister, Zoey, for their
support.
1. See http://www.google.com (search conducted on Jan. 28, 2005).
2. See, e.g., Alain de Botton, Editorial, Workers of the World, Relax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,2004, at
A 17; Stephen Roach, Comment, The Challenge of China and India, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31,2004; Neil
King Jr. & Scott Miller, U.S. Could Face New Export Tariffs: WTO Authorizes Measures For Violating
Trade Rules; A Setback for Bush, Congress, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2004, at A3.
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standards in order to gain insight into the efficacy of particular regulatory mech-
anisms in the context of economic globalization.
3
Today's globalized international trade regime has expanded markets for
MNCs through instruments like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Pro-
duction and consumption markets have moved rapidly beyond national borders.
On the one hand, private businesses have seen profits rise while consumers in
developed countries have seen prices drop. On the other hand, agribusinesses
have replaced subsistence farmers, Wal-Mart has overwhelmed Mom and Pop,
and developing countries have felt pressure to limit environmental and labor
regulations in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). MNCs have
thrived in the era of globalization, rationalizing the use of relatively unfettered
access to the developing world's treasure chest of abundant resources and inex-
pensive labor in order to benefit their bottom lines. With that said, it is irrational
to decry expanded markets and increased profits as purely negative. In the post-
World War II era of globalization, overall standards of living have improved,
infant mortality has declined, life expectancy has increased, and more people
have access to education.4 Over the same period of time, the gap between the
"haves" and the "have-nots" has widened. The rich have been getting richer,
often at the expense of the poor who have been sinking deeper into poverty.5
Heightened economic incentives and increasingly ineffective legal regimes
have combined to create a single-minded monolith of MNCs. These organiza-
3. For the purposes of this Note, the definition of human rights is drawn from the United Dec-
laration on Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 10, 1948. See G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183rd Plenary Mtg., at 71,
U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
4. Paul Masson, Globalization: Facts and Figures, IMF Policy Discussion Papers, International
Monetary Fund, Oct. 2001, at 7, available at http-//www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2001/
pdp04.pdf (last visited Apr. 11,2005).
5. The story of the 20th century was of remarkable average income growth, but it is
also quite obvious that the progress was not evenly dispersed. The gaps between
rich and poor countries, and rich and poor people within countries, have grown.
The richest quarter of the world's population saw its per capita GDP increase nearly
six-fold during the century, while the poorest quarter experienced less than a three-
fold increase (Chart lb). Income inequality has clearly increased.
Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?, IMF Issues Brief, International Monetary Fund, Apr. 12,
2000 (Corrected Jan. 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/O 4 120 0 .htm
(last visited Apr. 11,2005).
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tions have little incentive to respect human rights and the environment in the
wake of their profit grabbing. Consider the list of MNCs operating within the
boundaries of repressive states, and in some cases in conjunction with these re-
gimes, as a telltale example. This "race to the bottom" has not gone unnoticed or
unchallenged. This Note evaluates two important regulatory trends undertaken
by the United States and the European Union (EU) in order to reconcile two real-
ities of the globalized world economy: first, the corporate-led drive to lower prices
and increase profit margins, and second, the disrespect for basic human rights that
has resulted. Section I evaluates the effect that globalization has had on human
rights, focusing specifically on the lack of existing regulation and the tricky legal
environment in which this conflict must be addressed. Section II provides an in-
depth analysis of the current civil-liability movement in the United States, high-
lighting important recent developments in Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) litiga-
tion. Section III analyzes the latest regulatory development in Europe, focusing
specifically on the 2002 Green Paper that is supposed to shape EU policy toward
corporate compliance. After examining the strengths and weaknesses of each reg-
ulatory movement, Section IV proposes a hybrid solution.
I. GLOBALIZATION'S ADVERSE EFFECT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The erosion of borders and market barriers that underpins the globalization
era has switched the balance of power from individual state-based units to pri-
vate MNCs operating in the absence of an effective regulatory regime. This sec-
tion describes the effect this phenomenon has had on worldwide human rights
standards.
A. Strengthened Multinational Corporations
The impact of globalization is unyielding, a presence that permeates nearly
every corner of the world. The once impenetrable walls of state sovereignty and
cultural autonomy have crumbled in the face of global markets, trade liberaliza-
tion, capital exports, and the MNC.6
The economic power and influence of the MNC is undeniable, surpassing
that of many countries worldwide. Consider for a moment that in 2002, British
6. For the purposes of this Note, MNCs are to be defined as businesses geared toward exploi-
tation of the global markets with limited loyalty to their country of incorporation.
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Petroleum, the fifth largest global company, and the largest in Europe, had rev-
enues 7 that exceeded the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of fifteen
countries.' Consider that the total sales of the world's four largest MNCs exceed
the total GDP for the entire African continent.9 The economic incentive for
these trends to continue is clear: MNC operation, and global business in general,
is a profit-driven machine. Companies must keep up with ever-increasing
shareholder demands and heightened global competition. Developing countries
provide easy access to untapped natural resources-oil and energy, most
commonly-and cheap labor markets, which allow MNCs to keep costs down.
Production, distribution, and resource extraction efforts are being moved every
day from European and American soil to more fertile foreign territories."
Globalization has created opportunities that could not have been imagined
as the foundations for today's legal regimes were being laid at Bretton Woods."
Existing laws have proved incapable of regulating powerful entities like MNCs
and controlling the rapid movement of labor and capital; jurisdictional com-
plexities hinder the development of effective, robust legislation. Host-country
laws that would govern the behavior of MNCs operating in their sovereign ter-
ritory are either nonexistent or completely impotent in the face of huge financial
investment. International law, another logical tool, traditionally does not apply
to private actors, a category that includes MNCs. Jurisdictional loopholes in
host-country domestic laws make it difficult for U.S. or European legislation to
7. $178,721,000 according the Fortune's Global 500 (July 18, 2003), available at www.
fortunecom.
8. For a comprehensive list of global GDP rankings in 2002, see http://www.countrywatch.
com/includes/grank/gdpnumericppp.asp (last visited Mar. 2005).
9. Pall A. Davidsson, Note, Legal Enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibility Within the EU,
8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 529, 529 (2002) (citing European Parliament, Committee on Development
and Cooperation, Report on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing
Countries: Toward a European Code of Conduct, EUR. PARL. Doc. (Final A4-0508/1998, PE
228.198/fin) (1998) 10).
10. See, e.g., Andrew Parker, Tracking Europe's Outsourcing Stampede, Forrester Research, May
27, 2004, at http://www.forrester.com/Research/Document/Excerpt/0, 7 2 11,34539,00.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2005); Stephanie Moore & William Martorelli, Midyear 2004 Update: North Ameri-
can Offshore Outsourcing, Forrester Research, July 14, 2004, available at http://www.forrester.com/
Research/Document/Excerpt/0,7211,3 4 87 5 ,00.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
11. For a discussion regarding the changing roles of international financial banks and inter-
governmental development institutions in a globalized world economy, see Antony Anghie, Time
Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 243 (2000).
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govern MNC subsidiaries incorporated abroad. The unequal political and eco-
nomic balance under which most bilateral investment treaties are negotiated
confines host governments and heavily favors MNCs operating in foreign terri-
tories. 12 Chapter 1 1 of NAFTA provides a well-documented example: not only
are shareholders granted the right to sue foreign governments, but the provision
allows these investors to dictate the forum and circumstances for the dispute
settlement. 3 The issue of how to monitor and regulate MNC behavior, particu-
larly in the context of an MNC's functioning within the boundaries of a foreign
territory, is becoming a major global issue worthy of increased focus.
As the forces of economic and social globalization continue to exert pres-
sures in new and underregulated areas, attention must be paid to the results of
these situations. Corporate behavior, and its effects on global human rights stan-
dards, is an ideal prism through which to examine these issues. The inclusion of
human rights in this discussion provides not only a way to illuminate an area of
12. See Peter Hardstaff, The Flexibility Myth: Why GATS Is a Bad Model for a New WTO In-
vestment Agreement, Paper presented to Seminar on WTO Investment Agreement, Geneva,
Mar. 20, 2003, at http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/cambriefs/flexmyth.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2005) (discussing the perils of bilateral negotiation, including a lack of capacity-economic, intel-
lectual, and political-smaller, developing countries face throughout the bilateral negotiation
process). In this same context, the Ambassador of Bangladesh to the WTO stated:
When you go into a bilateral format of the negotiations, you are vulnerable. Why?
Because against a major developed country, you simply cannot withstand the level
of scrutiny. And you do not have the strength in the numbers that you get in the
multilateral process. This is exactly what happens bilaterally in the WTO. Within a
multilateral context, in the WTO, sometimes developed countries are unable to get
their way with us. But when you come to the bilateral mode, we find that where
they are unable to persuade us to agree to something multilaterally, they apply pres-
sure bilaterally to get it done.
Id. at 4 (quoting the Ambassador of Bangladesh to the WTO). For the text of the model U.S.
Bilateral Investment Treaty, see http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/Investment/Model_
BIT/asset upload_file847 6897.pdf(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
13. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, arts. 1101-1120, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993). For a discussion of the myriad issues related to the development of Chapter 11 juris-
prudence, see generally Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001); William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States:
Trials and Errors Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563 (2002); Carlos G. Garcia,
All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-
State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301 (2004); see also Ian A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets
Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 229 (2001); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 256-58 (1988).
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international jurisprudence and international relations that remains underregu-
lated, but also highlights an inherent conflict between the most basic metric of
justice and dignity-human rights standards-and the global drive for eco-
nomic advancement. Part B provides the first step in this analysis: a look at the
existing international regulatory regime and the role it currently plays in the in-
teraction of the MNC with human rights standards.
B. The Ineffectiveness of Existing International Covenants
The international and domestic legal difficulties in regulating MNC behav-
ior are compounded by ineffective compliance mechanisms in modern human
rights law. Current human rights doctrine grew from a seed planted following
the conclusion of World War II. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),4 a nonbinding U.N. General Assembly Resolution, first gave individ-
uals international legal rights, and loosely set out the principles now solidified in
two binding international covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) 15 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 6 While binding only on the official actions of
state signatories, these three documents outline what has become the accepted
definition of global human rights standards. The ICCPR protects civil and po-
litical rights, including the rights to life and liberty, and also protects individuals
against genocide, slavery, and forced labor.'
7
While the two international covenants outline general rights for individuals
worldwide, in many cases their texts do not enumerate each of the individual
rights established. For example, the ICESCR guarantees the right to economic
self-determination, the right to have safe and healthy working conditions, the
right to unionize, and the right to a minimum standard of living, but it does not
mention specific wage levels, minimum ages, or the acceptable minimum for en-
vironmental working conditions.' International organizations like the Interna-
14. UDHR,supra note 3, at 71.
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
16. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N.GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCRI.
17. See ICCPR, supra note 15, at 53-54.
18. See ICESCR, supra note 16, at 49-50.
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tional Labour Organization (ILO) have been created to provide more detailed
guidance in certain areas. Founded in 1919, the ILO has developed a binding inter-
national covenant, The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multi-
national Enterprises and Social Policy (the Tripartite Declaration), which
establishes minimum labor standards and rights, defines the right to organize,
sets minimum age requirements, and abolishes forced labor. 9 Another issue that
prevents existing international covenants from handling specific human rights-
related problems is their inherently voluntary nature. States may choose to ig-
nore these agreements altogether, or choose to selectively ratify certain provi-
sions while ignoring others. The impact of this discriminatory state support for
international covenants like the ICCPR and the Tripartite Declaration is clear:
MNCs will seek out and exploit states that have chosen not to ratify certain glo-
bal compacts, in the process, essentially nullifying both substantive and policy-
based advancements reached by these agreements. 20
C. A Well-Documented Problem
The ILO established the World Commission on the Social Dimension of
Globalization in February 2002 to evaluate how best to deal with changes in so-
cietal conceptualizations of human rights that result from globalization. 21 Some
view these changes as purely negative-increasing the economic and cultural
distance between developed and developing countries, adding to already wide-
spread poverty, poor labor conditions, famine, and disease. 22 Others contend that
globalization has begun to close this gap between rich and poor. There are more
jobs, there is more capital injected into struggling economies, and thus there is a
higher standard of living characterized by increased life expectancy, lower in-
fant mortality rates, and an improved health care and education infrastructure.23
19. See International Labour Organization, ILO Mandate, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
about/mandate.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
20. Indeed, there is one school of thought that uses empirical statistical evidence to highlight an
apparent lack of compliance to various human rights treaties by states signatories. See, e.g., Oona
A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
21. See International Labour Organization, World Commission on the Social Dimension of Glo-
balization, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005) (de-
scribing the program).
22. See Vandana Shiva, Globalization and Poverty, RESURGENCE, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 15.
23. See Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy, at http://
econ.worldbank.org/prr/subpage.php?sp=2477 (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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Regardless of how one perceives these effects, an undeniable byproduct of
economic globalization is a strengthened MNC, increasingly willing and able to
operate in foreign territories and exploit varying human rights standards.
Whether host governments choose to defend the human rights of their citizens
in the face of mounting global economic pressure and increasing MNC influ-
ence remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that MNCs must be held ac-
countable for their own behavior and brought into check through the
development of strengthened regulatory mechanisms.
Can the drive for corporate profits, facilitated and exacerbated by economic
globalization, be made to coexist with universal notions of respect for human
rights? For several reasons, the answer to this question is, and must be, "yes."
Commentators contend that existing market forces are enough to guide corpo-
rate behavior.24 If the majority of investors desires a corporate focus on labor
standards and human rights, the market will certainly bear that out. Indeed,
there is a nascent market of consumers who believe that profits are only part of
what makes a company attractive. Socially responsible investment companies
25
are becoming more abundant, as are business models built on a socially con-
scious ethos,26 and products packaged specifically to notify consumers of fair
trade practices, child labor standards, and environmental consciousness. 27 With
a strong human rights track record and a progressive social stance, corporations
may also be able to attract otherwise unattainable, socially conscious profession-
als. The sector of professional, investor, and consumer markets driven by factors
other than the bottom line remains small, however. Public image and brand-
sensitive marketing do not reflect a change in policy and will have no major ef-
24. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson, The Promises of Corporate Codes of Conduct, HUM. RTS. DIA-
LOGUE, Fall 2000, at 16, available at http://www.cceia.org/media/634-hrd2-4.pdf?PHPSESSID=
db8ed6b7c64bld68e03d1400cf391 1c2 (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
25. For an example of investment companies built around the notion of socially conscious in-
vestment strategies, see Domini Social Investments, Home Page, at http://www.domini.com (last
visited Apr. 8, 2005); see also KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., Socially Responsible Investing Re-
search, at http://www.kld.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2005); SocialFunds.com, Home Page, at http://
www.socialfunds.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
26. See Satya Menon, The Socially Conscious Corporation: Can Companies Do Well By Doing
Good?, CAPITAL IDEAS, Fall 1999, available at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/news/capideas/fal19 9/
menon.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
27. See Kathleen C. Lonergan et al., Socially Conscious Investing and Its Influence on Brand Im-
age,at http//130.195.95.71:808 1/WWW/ANZMAC200 l/anzmac/AUTHORS/pdfs/Lonergan.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8,2005).
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fect in practice. The fact is, socially driven market forces are a long way off from
moving corporate behavior away from the profit-driven bottom line.
Some international observers are requiring more from MNCs than just
profits, demanding that corporations recognize their societal obligation to ad-
here to and respect the basic human rights norms laid out in documents like the
ICCPR and the Tripartite Declaration. The increased presence of human
rights-focused nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Amnesty In-
ternational and Human Rights Watch, has intensified the focus on the impor-
tance of human rights, raised public interest levels, and fueled international
media coverage.2" Corporations that are exposed as human rights violators are
often publicly shamed into changing their policy.29 These developments, while
certainly not comprehensive or widespread, are good indications of efforts to ad-
dress the problem of MNC human rights violations. With traditional legal
mechanisms, market forces, and media pressure being largely ineffective,
MNCs continue to invest and operate in countries where massive human rights
violations continue to occur. Two fairly recent developments in global juris-
prudence are endeavoring to remedy this worrisome trend, by attempting, in di-
verse ways, to hold corporations accountable for their actions.
II. CIVIL LIABILITY, AMERICAN STYLE
The United States and the EU are unquestionably two of the world's geopo-
litical"° and economic3 leaders. In addition to the incorporation of many of the
world's largest and most powerful MNCs,32 divergent American and EU regu-
28. See, e.g., Dzidek Kedzia, Submission by Amnesty International under Decision 2004/116 on the
"Responsibilities of Transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to Human
Rights," Al Index: POL 34/006/2004, Sept. 29, 2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/ibrary/
index/ENGPOL340062004 (last visited Apr. 11,2005).
29. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, 1999, Human Rights Watch: World Report 1999, Special Issues
and Campaigns, at http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/special/corporations.html#corporate (last
visited Apr. 11, 2005) ("Royal Dutch/Shell responded to criticism by unveiling programs to high-
light its performance on human rights.").
30. The United States, France, and Britain are 3 of 5 permanent members of the United Na-
tions Security Council, the most powerful multinational geopolitical organization in the world.
31. Consider that the United States, France, and Britain are 3 of 5 permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council and, according to the WTO, home to 8 of the world's top 10 export-
ers. World Trade Organization, Leading Exporters and Importers in World Merchandise Trade, 2002,at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statise/its2003_e/sectionl-e/iO5.xls (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
32. See Fortune's Global 500,supra note 7.
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latory trends make the two regions together a perfect place from which to begin
evaluating the developments in corporate governance and the regulation of
MNCs. A comparative analysis of these developments in the United States and
the EU will provide valuable learning on the path to finding an acceptable solu-
tion to the existing regulatory problems. This section focuses on advances being
made in the United States, specifically through the civil liability created by the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). Part A examines the ATCA's historical develop-
ment; Part B considers Doe v. Unocal, the most important case currently on the
U.S. federal docket; Part C analyzes the potential impact of Doe; and Part D sug-
gests strengths and weaknesses of the ATCA-led civil liability regulatory model.
A. ATCA Conception
The ATCA is one of the shortest pieces of legislation found in the catalogue
of U.S. federal legislation. Adopted in 1789 as part of the original Judiciary Act,33
the law states simply, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States."34 As short and as seemingly direct as the
statutory language is, rarely has there been a law that has been at the root of so
much international debate.
1. Cause of Action, Jurisdiction, Nature of Defendants Made Clear
After almost 200 years of obscurity, the ATCA was the vehicle by which a for-
eign citizen circumvented traditional notions of jurisdiction and state sovereignty
by attempting to gain access to U.S. federal courts in order to bring a human rights-
based claim against another foreign citizen. In 1980, members of the Filirtiga fam-
ily-Paraguayan expatriates living in Brooklyn-filed suit against Americo
Norberto Pefia-Irala (Pefia), another Paraguayan citizen. The Filrtiga family al-
leged that Pefia had tortured and murdered seventeen year-old Joelito Filirtiga
while Pefia served as the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. 5 In a
groundbreaking decision, the Second Circuit granted jurisdiction and allowed the
Filirtiga family to bring their suit against Pefia. The Second Circuit adopted a lit-
eral interpretation of the ATCA language, finding Pefia's torturing of Joelito to
33. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 2000).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
35. Filfrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
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have violated the "law of nations" threshold." The Fildrtiga holding extended U.S.
jurisdiction into areas normally settled by the laws of the foreign state where the
events in question occurred, as required by principles of international law.
Fildrtiga opened the jurisprudential floodgates, and in the process, raised
many more questions than answers. Despite the controversy surrounding it,
Fildrtiga has led to a relatively consistent interpretation of the plaintiffs causes of
action under the ATCA and jurisdictional allowances. The Ninth37 and Elev-
enth38 Circuits agreed that the ATCA "open[ed] the federal courts for adjudica-
tion of the rights already recognized by international law."3 Both the
jurisdictional- and international-claim standards were recently solidified by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. °
Since Fildrtiga, the U.S. federal appellate courts have been consistent in de-
fining the types of actors that may be named as defendants in these suits. The
language in Fildrtiga that definitively created liability for certain acts conducted
under the color of state law4 has been consistently affirmed. While it is clear that
suits based on official state acts are barred from being heard in U.S. courts under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),42 the question of private-actor
36. In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to
lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human
rights is in their individual and collective interest. Among the rights universally
proclaimed by all nations ... is the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for
the purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader
before him-hostis humani generis, as enemy of mankind.
Id. at 890.
37. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cit. 1994).
38. See Abebe-lira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11 th Cir. 1996).
39. Fildrtiga, 630 E2d at 887.
40. We think it is correct, then, to assume that the First Congress understood that the district
courts would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of
nations.... We assume, too, that no development in the two centuries from the enact-
ment of§ 1350 to the birth of the modern line of cases beginning with Fidrtiga v. Pefia-
Ira/a [citation omitted] has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a
claim under the law of nations as an element of common law; Congress has not in any
relevant way amended § 1350 or limited civil common law power by another statute.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761 (2004) (citation omitted).
41. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken 'under color of' state law.").
42. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (2000). FSIA provides immunity for official state acts, with two major
exceptions: there is no immunity for substantially commercial acts and foreign states have the
power to waive the right immunity granted. Id. §§ 1602-1605.
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liability for state action remained unanswered until 1994, when the Second Cir-
cuit declared private actors liable for violations of international law in Kadic v.
Karadzic.
43
2. Specifics Regarding Actors and Claims
Defining violations of international law under the ATCA has proved much
more problematic than the procedural issues that were effectively settled by Fildr-
tiga. The question of which international law violations constitute legitimate
claims depends on who has committed them, and forces U.S. courts to identify a
tenet of customary international law, distinguish the boundaries of the principle,
and enforce it in contexts and ways that they have seldom, if ever, done.44 The Sosa
Court, through comprehensive historical analysis and careful jurisprudential in-
terpretation, solidified a form of the Fildrtiga-Kadic standard, which allowed for
"any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of interna-
tional character accepted by the civilized world."45 This reasoning is in line with
the general trend of U.S. appellate court decisions, which rely on customary inter-
national law to find private actors liable under the ATCA for violations ofjus co-
gens norms (whether committed under the color of state law or not), but not liable
in U.S. courts for common torts.46 The termjus cogens refers to certain principles
from which no derogation is permitted, regardless of treaty obligations.47 Suits
against private actors that fall within this universally applicable realm, including
43. 70 F3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that activities of "universal concern" constitute viola-
tions of the law of nations, or international law, not only when they are committed by state actors,
but when committed by private actors as well).
44. See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S.for Violating International
Law, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREICN AFF. 81, 82 (1999).
45. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
46. Compare the standard developed in Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761 ("The jurisdictional grant is best
read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of
action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability
at the time [of its original enactment].") with that developed in Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42 (identify-
ing offenses of "universal concern" as crimes punishable in civil arenas by standards of interna-
tional law through domestic vehicles like the ATCA). Also of note is the distinction drawn by
Flores v. S. Peru Copper, 343 F.3d 140, 156 (2d Cir. 2003) between "'wrong[s]' that are 'of mutual,
and not merely several, concern' to States" (quoting Fildrtiga, 630 F2d at 888) (emphasis added).
"Matters of'several' concern among States are matters in which States are separately and indepen-
dently interested." Flores, 343 F.3d at 155.
47. Jus cogens is defined as "a mandatory norm of general international law from which no two
or more nations may exempt themselves or release one another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695
(7th ed. 1999).
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genocide, war crimes, piracy, slavery, torture, and summary execution, have been
consistently allowed to be heard in U.S. federal court.48
In summary, thus far, the basic jurisprudential value of the ATCA-based
suits is clear on the following issues. First, the ATCA provides both subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and a cause of action in U.S. federal court.49 Second, in order to
state a valid claim under the ATCA, the claim must: (1) be made by a foreign
plaintiff; (2) allege a tortious act; and (3) constitute a violation of the law of na-
tions. Not so clear, however, are answers to questions seeking detail.5" For
instance, how is an international violation to be defined? To what extent are in-
ternational violations committed by joint state-private actors justiciable in U.S.
federal court? What level of complicity must a private actor be guilty of in order
to risk liability? Is there any difference in liability faced by specific classes of pri-
vate actors with respect to various international law violations? That is, dojus
cogens violations require a different standard of legal evaluation than individual
cases of torture? These questions, among others, were raised in a 1997 case
brought by a group of Burmese villagers in the Central District Court of Califor-
nia under the aegis of the ATCA.
The suit accused the Burmese government of massive human rights viola-
tions-including forced labor, torture, rape, and murder-and attempted to
implicate an American oil company, Unocal Corporation (Unocal), and a
French energy conglomerate, Total, S.A. (Total), in the violations.5' Doe v. Uno-
cal had, and continues to have, profound implications for the world of American
corporate behavior and human rights. The plaintiffs in Doe attempted to expand
upon principles established in Fildrtiga and Karadzic by using the U.S. federal
48. See, e.g., Flores, 343 F.3d at 167 ("Our position is consistent with the recognition in [Fildrtigal
that the right to be free from torture embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc, A/810, at 71 (1948), has attained the status
of customary international law.").
49. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp.2d 1294, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Doe 1/1.
50. For a comprehensive discussion on the details of ATCA litigation and its impact, see gener-
ally BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S.
COURTS (1996); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989); Roger O'Keefe, Civil Actions in US Courts in Respect of
Human Rights Abuses Committed Abroad: Would the World's Oppressors Be Wise to Stay at Home?, 9
AFR. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 15 (1997); Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and Interna-
tional Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1 (2002).
51. Doe V, I10 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
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system to hold MNCs liable for violations of international law committed in
their behalf by the Burmese government.
B. Doe v. Unocal
Despite the deep, ongoing political unrest in Burma, and the ruling govern-
ment's poor human rights record, both Unocal and Total contracted with Burma
in order to exploit its oil reserves. In order to protect physical and infrastructural
investments from local political instability and a festering civil war, as well as to
help manage local labor, both companies employed members of the Burmese mil-
itary. It was this group of Burmese military operatives that was accused of violat-
ing international standards on which the complaint was based. Over the past six
years, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals have attempted to determine if, and to what extent,
Unocal52 is to be held liable for the human rights violations committed by the Bur-
mese military operatives. In essence, the issue was whether Unocal could be held
liable for the actions committed by members of the Burmese military while these
individuals were working to protect Unocal's investments.
In September of 2000, the District Court provided the initial answer to this
question in an opinion known as Doe V The court in Doe V granted Unocal's
request for summary judgment, finding insufficient evidence of official state ac-
tion in order to hold Unocal liable.53 Until Doe V, ATCA doctrine required a
showing of official state action in the commitment of an international law viola-
tion. While rejecting the claim on that ground, Doe Vaffirmed the application of
Fildrtiga's jurisdictional and cause of action allowances in the MNC context. Doe
V also discussed two critically important issues previously unaddressed in
ATCA jurisprudence. First, the case addressed the degree to which, if at all, an
individual MNC is liable for violations of international law committed under
the color of state law on behalf of the MNC. Second, Doe V raised questions re-
garding what specific activity, if any, is required to attach an MNC in a suit al-
leging violations that fall short of violatingjus cogens norms-such as individual
cases of forced labor, torture, rape, and murder.
54
52. Both Total and the Burmese military were dismissed from the action.
53. Doe V, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
54. See id. at 1304.
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The distinction betweenjus cogens violations and violations of international
law that fall short ofjus cogens is a critical one. As noted above, clear violations
ofjus cogens norms automatically warrant a claim in U.S. federal court. Prior to
Doe V, the standards for violations falling short ofjus cogens had been unclear.
The question of how the U.S. system should classify a single murder committed
under the color of state law rather than a systematic string of murders commit-
ted as part of a genocidal movement (a catastrophe that would certainly classify
as a violation ofjus cogens norms), was the major question underpinning the Doe
V case. While not explicit on this particular question, the Sosa Court makes clear
that a conservative approach to the application of an international law standard
must be taken in the future.
55
Although the District Court cleared Unocal of all liability (it found the evi-
dence tying Unocal to the human rights violations insufficient), it did set forth a
number of important principles concerning ATCA application to MNC liability
in these two stated areas.
56
In its review of Doe V, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals focused primarily
on the same two issues: is an MNC liable for the actions committed on its behalf,
and if so, what types of violations are required in order to attach the MNC as a de-
fendant in the suit? While the specific tests employed by each court (the district
court used U.S. domestic standards, 57 while the court of appeals relied on interna-
tional standards)58 to determine MNC complicity in state action are fascinating,
55. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761 ("The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of in-
ternational law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.").
56. Doe V,I 110 F Supp. 2d at 1294.
57. The Doe V court used a test known as the "joint action" test, borne out of U.S. Civil Rights
Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983) litigation. See Doe V,I 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. In granting the summary
judgment request, the court found "no evidence that Unocal 'participated in or influenced' the
[Burmese] military's unlawful conduct" or "evidence that Unocal 'conspired' with the military to
commit the challenged conduct." Id. at 1306-07.
58. The Ninth Circuit employed international human rights legal standards rather than U.S.
federal standards to evaluate the allegations. Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter Doe VI]. The Ninth Circuit panel focused on the international criminal standards de-
veloped by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Id. at 950. The panel deemed the evidence sufficient to satisfy
both the required mens rea-that Unocal "knew or had reason to know" that the military had the
intent to commit the offense elements for complicity, id. at 951, 953 (quoting Prosecutor v.
Musema, ICTR-96-13-T (Jan. 27, 2000), at http://www.ictr.org/), and actus reus-that Unocal's
"practical assistance or encouragement ... ha[d] a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
... forced labor." Id. at 952.
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the relevance of each is of less than critical importance, especially in light of the
Ninth Circuit's pending en banc opinion. What is of supreme importance, how-
ever, are the implications of Unocal's potential civil liability for human rights vio-
lations conducted by Burmese citizens in order to facilitate Unocal's oil drilling
project.
Determining specifics regarding the second issue-namely, which individ-
ual allegations (rape, murder, torture, forced labor) require proof of official state
action in order to attach an ATCA claim-is not critical. Once again, however,
the general principle to be gathered from the doctrinal analysis by each court has
far-reaching implications for regulation of MNCs. Whether the en banc opinion
affirms the broader doctrinal analysis employed by the Ninth Circuit59 or
chooses to adopt a more conservative approach,6" the general principle of MNC
liability established in Doe V and affirmed in Doe VI is what really matters in
terms of implications for MNC human rights-related behavior.
61
C. Short-Term Implications Unclear
The future of ATCA doctrine as it relates to MNC liability is clear in some
areas, but cloudy in others. At this point, it seems fairly certain that the U.S. fed-
59. The Doe VI opinion made clear that forced labor is a modern form of slavery and thus re-
quires no state action to constitute a violation of the law of nations. Id. at 946 (quoting Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 E2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). In the
same vein, the opinion also made clear that while murder, rape, and torture require state action to
constitute a law of nations violation when committed in isolation, those same violations do not re-
quire state action when committed "in pursuit of genocide or war crimes," slavery, or forced labor.
Id. (discussing Kadic, 70 F3d at 242-43).
60. The only related issue the Doe V Court chose to address was whether a modern definition of
slavery necessarily included forced labor. The Court relied on a report filed by the International
Labour Organization Commission of Inquiry to conclude that the historically narrow definition
of the "term 'slavery' now encompasses forced labor." Doe V, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1308 (discussing
International Labour Organization, Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma): Report of the Commission
of Inquiry Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to
Examine the Observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), ILO, Pt.
IV.9.A 198 (1998)).
61. The Sosa Court declined the opportunity to discuss the merits of ATCA suits that name pri-
vate party defendants (including MNCs), outside of documenting the existence of the issue in a
footnote: "A related consideration [to whether an international norm is sufficiently definite to
support a cause of action] is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corpora-
tion or an individual." Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.20.
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eral court system will remain an open forum for foreign individuals to sue cor-
porations. The requirements for plaintiffs have been explicitly laid out: (1) a
claim by an alien; (2) alleging a tort; and (3) a violation of the law of nations.62
While the Sosa opinion solidifies much of modern ATCA doctrine, its applica-
tion to cases naming MNCs as defendants is yet to be determined. Protestations
from the Bush Administration 63 and probusiness commentators alike64 ensure
that the jurisprudential developments will be followed closely by all.
The notion that plaintiffs attempting to show violations of internationaljus
cogens norms are not required to show official state action to attach MNCs to
their claim is quite clear. Despite their divergent interpretations of previous ap-
pellate court holdings, the district court in Doe V6  and the Ninth Circuit in Doe
VI6 affirmed this standard. Beyond solidifying these widely accepted principles,
however, the differences in the two opinions leave two major questions open,
each with potentially large short-term implications for individual plaintiffs and
MNC defendants alike.
The standards used to determine MNC complicity in acts committed under
the color of state law have yet to be clarified. As mentioned earlier, Doe V used the
"joint action" test developed by U.S. civil rights litigation to hold that because it
did not willingly participate in the alleged activity, Unocal was not liable under
the ATCA. Doe VI instead used a method of evaluation borne of recent inter-
national human rights criminal proceedings. The Ninth Circuit found Unocal
liable on account of the MNC's knowing practical assistance of the human rights
violations committed by the Burmese military.
62. SeeDoe V, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1303.
63. In a recent amicus brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit on behalf on Unocal, the Bush Ad-
ministration declared any interpretation of the Act as providing a cause of action as improper:
"Reading the ATS'[ATCA's] grant of jurisdiction as a broad implied right of action cannot today
be reconciled with the Supreme Court's repeated refusal in recent decisions to recognize an im-
plied private cause of action." See Brief for the United States of America at 12, Doe I v. Unocal, 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-56603, 0056628). The brief went on the say that "[t]his Court's ap-
proach to the ATS bears serious implications for our current war against terrorism, and permits
ATS claims to be easily asserted against our allies in that war." Id. at 3.
64. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 55 (2003) ("Recent efforts by the executive branch to limit the ex-
pansive interpretation of the ATS are commendable and should continue to guide courts in read-
ing the ATS.").
65. See Doe V, 110 F. Supp. 2d. at 1304.
66. See Doe VI, 395 F3d at 949.
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These two tests are certainly not the only standards available. Among the
many theories suggested,67 two stand out for their historic operability and poten-
tial legitimacy. The first theory draws from international environmental law,
where private actors responsible for violations are held to the same standards as
sovereign nations.6" The second proposal suggests adoption of U.S. tort standards
used to determine joint and several liability. Given the limited precedence of
MNC-related ATCA litigation from which to draw, future courts might choose
to do any number of things.
The immediate implications of these uncertainties cut both ways. Plaintiffs
obviously favor the more liberal Doe VI model, but a reversal by the Ninth Cir-
cuit's en banc panel will not foreclose future litigation. Various other circuits be-
lieve strongly in the merits of ATCA litigation, and based on past opinions,
would likely offer the forum in which a similar case could be brought and won.
As in any contentious jurisprudential debate, apart from Congress, only the
Supreme Court can completely stop forum shopping that results from a circuit
split. The Sosa Court was clear about the limited role of the ATCA as a vehicle
for reaching U.S. federal court, reserving viable complaints to allegations of spe-
cific international law violations.
69
For MNCs, the implications of the currently accepted doctrine and the
forthcoming Ninth Circuit en banc opinion are much more urgent. An affirma-
tion of Doe VI would certainly result in an explosion of litigation. The "dozen
current cases cit[ing] corporate defendants for their operations in Asia, the Middle
East, Africa and Latin America.. .[with] damages claimed exceed[ing] $200 bil-
lion" 70 would only be a start. Unfortunately for MNCs and probusiness interests,
an increase of ATCA-based litigation is not necessarily predicated on an affir-
mation of the Doe VI holding. Even if the Ninth Circuit en banc panel rejects the
Doe VI analysis, plaintiffs are free to bring cases in other circuits, 71 which can
67. See generally Courtney Shaw, Note, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1359, 1380-82 (2001) (discussing the various standards
courts apply under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
68. This theory was applied in the famous Trail Smelter Arbitration. See Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion, 3 REP. INT'L ARBITRAL AWARDS 1905 (1937); see also Kurt Taylor Gaubatz & Kathleen Kane,
The Trail Smelter Case, at http://www.gwu.edu/-jaysmith/Trail.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
69. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754 ("[Wle think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction en-
abled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and rec-
ognized at common law.").
70. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 64, at 7.
71. Id.
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adopt whatever means of interpretation they so choose. Despite that, an affirma-
tion of Doe VI will surely be seen by MNCs as the first domino to fall.
Different interpretations of the second issue left unclear by the Doe VI
holding-what level of state action is required to attach MNCs to claims of vio-
lations falling short ofjus cogens-each have unique implications. Both Doe V
and Doe VI affirmed the notion that claims allegingjus cogens violations require
no showing of state action in order to attach MNCs. Genocide, war crimes, sla-
very (including forced labor), and piracy committed in behalf of MNCs always
yield liability. It is just as clear that lesser tortious acts-battery, for example-
will never be grounds for MNC liability. Policy concerning activity that lies
somewhere in between the two-individual occurrences of murder, rape, and
torture-remains unsettled. Doe VI held that state action was required to attach
Unocal to claims of rape and murder, but not torture;72 Doe V was largely silent
on this issue. Doe VI's evaluation of these claims was predominantly based on
fact, but the Court's implication was that occurrences of these "middle ground"
violations committed in isolation (not to be deemed committed in furtherance of
a violation ofjus cogens) requires a showing of state action to attach.73
The near-term implications of this discrepancy do not affect either plaintiffs
or MNCs on a large scale. Despite the divergent requirements, the upper and
lower limits ofjus cogens and simple tort policies remain unchanged. Plaintiffs
know which claims are available to them, with and without the presence of state
action, and are able to determine whether to file suit based on the conservative
standard put in place by the Sosa opinion. Allegations concerning "middle
ground" violations are obviously not as well established. That said, MNCs must
determine their potential for liability and their defense strategies with respect to
each of the three categories in the same way that plaintiffs must evaluate their
claims.
D. Doe v. Unocal and its Effect on Corporate Compliance
An evaluation of the effect of the ATCA on corporate compliance doctrine
must be made while considering the entire body of litigation, not simply the im-
mediate ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's impending opinion of the Doe VI
appeal. Potential ongoing MNC liability under the ATCA will have broad ram-
72. See Doe VI, 395 F.3d at 954.
73. Id. at 960.
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ifications reaching areas of international human rights, international trade and
FDI, global geopolitics, and U.S. foreign policy.
74
1. In Support of MNC Liability
Analysis of the impact on global human rights of continued MNC liability
for crimes committed by host governments on behalf of the government's MNC
investors must begin with a review of the direct effect such a holding would
have on MNC behavior. Just as joint ventures like the one between Unocal and
Burma at issue in Doe v. Unocal fuel corrupt governments and propagate shame-
ful human rights violations, potentially far-reaching liability will translate into
real incentives for MNCs to become accountable for their choices and prompt a
change in the "bottom-line-only" ethos by altering specific investment and em-
ployment policies. Would heavy potential liability in U.S. federal court mean
that MNCs would no longer do business with abusive regimes? Are these
merely the fanciful meanderings of overly idealistic NGOs, or are they steeped
in a measure of reality that will yield concrete results? I believe the key to this
question, in part, lies in the answer to another very practical question: how much
money will successful plaintiffs actually get? If plaintiffs receive anywhere near
what most are asking,75 the impact of these court cases will quickly shift MNC
policy away from oppressive governments and toward a clearer respect for basic
human rights. These are, after all, the types of bottom-line messages that come
in loud and clear to the cost-benefit analysis-focused MNC management teams.
Even if damage awards continue to be impossible to extract, 76 a plaintiff's
ability to exact a measure of justice from MNCs for involvement in the alleged
crimes is still a large, consistent factor in a plaintiff's use of the ATCA as an av-
enue to U.S. federal court. Beyond simply offering a forum, U.S. courts offer
due process guarantees many plaintiffs would never receive in their home coun-
tries. Notions of systemic integrity and impartiality-speedy, impartial trials,
for example-are unheard of in many places, particularly under corrupt politi-
74. See Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE
L.J. 443, 466 (2001).
75. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS,supra note 64, at 7.
76. See Human Rights Watch, Myths and Facts about the Alien Tort Claims Act, at http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/atca/myths.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
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cal regimes.7 7 For many of these plaintiffs, the ability to seek personal vindication
is of primary concern, and a worthwhile end in itself.78 These "justice-related"
gains and the guarantee of a fair trial to address grievances are motivation enough
to continue with litigation. The more cases that are filed, and the longer the ju-
risprudence continues, the more likely there will eventually be significant finan-
cial redress.
Of course, there are limitations to the current ATCA doctrine. The first
limitation is directly attributable to the Act's narrow procedural construction.
The forum is a difficult one to reach, as basic principles of jurisdiction found in
U.S. and international law prevent most claims from ever reaching the trial
stage.79 U.S. corporate law, constructed to protect individual employees of U.S.
businesses, also plays a role in limiting the types of defendants named and the
specific circumstances under which claims may be brought.8" In addition, the
costs and time involved with filing suits against MNCs can be prohibitive.8" For-
eign governments, the true perpetrators in many ATCA suits, are largely immune
from U.S. law.82 The doctrine also severely limits the types of allegations that
qualify under the Act. Because of the ATCA's language, which limits valid
claims to violations of the "law of nations," traditional labor-related concerns like
sweatshop conditions, low wages, and long hours are typically not justiciable.8 3
Despite their legitimacy, these problems seem insignificant when compared to
the potential for regulating corporate behavior and raising the level of global
human rights standards in the process.
77. Following the kidnapping, torture, and murder of Joelito FilArtiga by Noberto Pefia-Irala,
the then-Inspector General of Police in Asunci6n, Paraguay, Joelito's father, Dr. Joel Filfrtiga
"commenced a criminal action in the Paraguayan courts against [Pefia] and the police... As a re-
sult, Dr. [FilArtiga's] attorney was arrested and brought to the police headquarters where, shack-
led to a wall, [Pefia] threatened him with death. This attorney, it is alleged, has since been
disbarred without just cause." Filirtiga v. Pefia-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
78. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76.
79. Forum non conveniens, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, and the Act of State Doctrine are each
major hurdles for plaintiffs to overcome.
80. Paul Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting and
Compliance, 37 INT'L LAW. 69, 84 (2003).
81. Terry Collingsworth, Beyond Reports and Promises: Enforcing Universally Accepted
Human Rights Standards in the Global Economy (2003), at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/
viewMedia.php/prmTemplatelD/8/prmID/874 (last visited Apr. 8, 2005) (Report from the
Achieving Global Justice seminar held at the Carnegie Council on February 6, 2003).
82. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (2000).
83. Collingsworth,supra note 81, at 2.
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2. Criticism of MNC Liability
MNCs are quite concerned with the trend in ATCA jurisprudence and, along
with the U.S. government, are aggressively attempting to close what they see as a
loophole in a very probusiness body of U.S. legislation. The legal attack on the
ATCA begins with the "cause of action" allowance84 and stretches to specific doc-
trinal interpretation issues, including the standards chosen to evaluate the law of
nations standard, the failure of courts to enforce statute of limitation require-
ments, and the requirement that plaintiffs exhaust all local remedies before seek-
ing a forum in the United States."5 Until the Supreme Court determines the
matter, juridical arguments, no matter how thoroughly constructed or logically
powerful, are often not where such large battles will be won or lost. Rhetorical and
statistical pleas to the public (and ultimately the legislature) are where the oppo-
nents to the Act are placing the most effort and making the largest gains.
Probusiness commentators Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas K. Mitroko-
stas envision a "nightmare scenario," in which ATCA suits threaten U.S. foreign
trade and cripple both inbound and outbound FDI while striking a huge blow to
the economies of target export countries.8 6 This scenario, fostered by unchecked
ATCA litigation against MNCs, could diminish U.S. merchandise trade (imports
plus exports) by $50 billion to $60 billion, cost the United States more than 100,000
manufacturing jobs, and raise oil prices drastically. They further claim that ad-
verse ATCA decisions could prompt firms to divest from U.S.-based investments
en masse, as they did in South Africa during the apartheid era." This level of di-
vestment would result in conservatively projected losses of $55 billion to U.S. FDI.
In attempting to weigh the potential impact of ATCA litigation on MNCs,
Hufbauer and Mitrokostas draw a parallel to the economic damage caused by
the heavy stream of asbestos claims in the United States. If ATCA damages ap-
proach the same heights as the asbestos awards, mass divestment is likely to re-
sult, with foreign-based MNCs deciding to avoid the United States altogether in
hopes of escaping liability.8 8
Whether these types of scenarios are likely, or even plausible, is a question bet-
ter handled by economists and political scientists. Given the fact that a single dol-
84. See, e.g., Brief for the United States of America, supra note 63, at 5.
85. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 64.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id. at 40.
88. Id. at 42.
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lar has never reached the pocket of any plaintiff, these worries can be fairly
characterized as speculative. The impetus for the business world to plead for
changes to ATCA doctrine is clear, however, and many of their complaints are
warranted. The ad hoc judicial decisions have created an array of doctrine, with
many potential interpretations and varying standards, which may be difficult for
MNCs to follow and adhere to. Additionally, the concerns voiced about forum
shopping may be warranted. 9
3. The Bottom Line
The current ATCA doctrine is an extremely complex area of law with po-
tentially enormous implications in many areas of global society. It provides a
limited means for foreign plaintiffs to exact justice from MNCs that participate
in human rights violations committed by foreign governments. Despite that, the
ATCA has not resulted in any financial reparation, and thus cannot yet be con-
sidered a concrete threat to MNC livelihood. If and when it reaches a point
where its effects can be seen to shape corporate behavior, there will have to be
some judicial or legislative changes made. MNCs must have reliable standards
to follow and must know explicitly the rules of the game they are playing. A
close look at what is being done by the EU to promote a uniform solution to the
problems of corporate behavior and human rights will provide valuable lessons
for the United States in attempting to find a solution viable to all parties.
III. THE CORPORATE CODE OF CONDUCT MOVEMENT
Another recent, broad-based development in the global initiative to regulate
corporate behavior is the phenomenon known simply as the "Corporate Code"
movement. Ranging in scope from individual MNC internal codes90 and industry-
89. Id. at 50.
90. See Davidsson, supra note 9, at 535 (citing European Parliament, Committee on Develop-
ment and Cooperation, Report on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Devel-
oping Countries: Toward a European Code of Conduct, EUR. PARL. Doc. (Final A4-0508/1998, PE
228.198/fin), 14).
JOSHUA M. CHANIN
specific initiatives 91 to national92 and international standards,93 the movement is
increasingly widespread and influential. Despite the momentum of the initia-
tive, there are inherent weaknesses in its lack of consistency and decidedly ad
hoc nature. In an effort to guide European MNCs in the face of the pressures of
globalization and combat the lack of uniformity of the Corporate Code move-
ment, the EU decided to attempt to develop a code of its own. This section
analyzes the voluntary corporate code movement in the EU, its influence on
MNC behavior, and the resultant impact on global human rights. Part A ad-
dresses the context of corporate codes and the Green Paper in broad terms; Part
B analyzes the strengths of the Green Paper; and Part C focuses on its short-
comings.
A. The Green Paper in the Context of Corporate Codes
In response to what the European Commission deemed "new concerns and
expectations from citizens, consumers, public authorities, and investors in the
context of globalization and large scale industrial change,"94 a green paper en-
titled "Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility"
was submitted to the European Community (EC) in June of 2001."5 For the EU,
a multinational organization with roots in the principles of free trade and a com-
mon commercial policy, this was its most aggressive move to date in attempting
to promote corporate social responsibility (CSR). Intended as the first step in a
move toward a uniform set of compliance standards throughout the EU, the
Green Paper is neither binding nor explicit in its suggestions. EU green papers,
by nature, are policy papers intended to stimulate discussion among interested
91. For an example of one of the many international nongovernmental organizations working
toward corporate compliance in the area of labor standards, see Clean Clothes, Home Page, at
http://www.cleanclothes.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
92. See, e.g., Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility: Green
Paper from Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs Unit, COM(01)366 final at
17 (July 2001) ("The Danish Social Index is a self-assessment tool developed by the Ministry of So-
cial Affairs for measuring the degree to which a company lives up to its social responsibilities.")
[hereinafter Promoting a European Framework].
93. See U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles, at http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last vis-
ited Apr. 8, 2005).
94. Promoting a European Framework, supra note 92, at 5.
95. Id.
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nongovernmental actors in a specific policy area.96 The focus of the document
was to spark debate on the merits of an EU corporate code in hopes of develop-
ing the most innovative, credible, and, ultimately, effective set of standards pos-
sible.97 As EU green papers often "provide the impetus for subsequent
legislation," 98 a closer look at the content of the Green Paper and analysis of the
range of solicited responses is a relevant and useful exercise. Part B evaluates the
positive aspects of the Green Paper; part C suggests areas in which it may be
strengthened. Despite the criticism, the Green Paper is a sound initial step to-
ward a very worthwhile end.
B. The Successes
In order to begin the process of building a framework for uniform stan-
dards of corporate conduct, the EU takes four important steps. First, the EC
makes a powerful statement simply in the Green Paper's release, one that imme-
diately raises awareness of the issue. The message is clear: there is an institu-
tional expectation that European MNCs are to balance a drive to generate
profits with contributions to social and environmental objectives.9 In other
words, the EC has declared that MNC behavior will not go unchecked or ig-
nored, and the EU will no longer be amenable to ignoring MNCs' sacrificing
human rights standards for the bottom line. In addition to emphasizing inher-
ent moral responsibilities, the Green Paper attempts to appeal to the bottom-line
nature of multinational corporations. In so doing, the Green Paper uses market-
based indicators of public support for the movement, including social and eco-
labels' °° and socially responsible investment schemes.' °'
96. See European Union Documents, Documents of Individual Institutions: European Commis-
sion, at http://europa.eu.int/documents/comm/indexen.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005) (discussing
the role and purpose of Green Papers and White Papers in the European Commission).
97. See Promoting a European Framework,supra note 92, at 3.
98. European Union Documents, supra note 96.
99. See Promoting a European Framework, supra note 92, at 5.
100. See id. at 19-20 (discussing the usage of product labels that indicate social and/or environ-
mental consciousness, e.g., "no child labor").
101. See id. at 20-21.
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Second, the fact that the Green Paper is an open, inclusive process that solic-
its the opinions of member states,'0 2 MNCs, °3 NGOs, ° industry-specific orga-
nizations, 10 5 and academics"t6 shows a strong sense of common purpose and a
willingness to cut through red tape to accomplish its goals. This process-based
inclusiveness will necessarily yield a more effective product than would an iso-
lated mandate from the EC. This commitment to transparency will help to
avoid the type of contentious struggle occurring in the United States between
the business community and those singularly committed to raising the base level
of human rights standards to which European MNCs are held.
Third, through support of major, widely accepted international standards,
the Green Paper sets out uniform, applicable baselines in the critical areas of
labor and human rights to which EU-based MNCs are expected to adhere. The
UN Global Compact establishes a baseline for the role of human rights and en-
vironmental protection in the global economy." 7 The Tripartite Declaration
specifies base levels for wage levels, working conditions, and child labor stan-
dards."8 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises provide voluntary principles
102. See, e.g., Poland's response at Green Paper-Active Country Perspective (Poland), at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/employment-scia/soc-diaI/csr/pdf2/044-COMPNETNAT-Responsibe-
Business-ForumPoland_01122 len.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
103. See, e.g., British Petroleum, British Petroleum's Submission to the European Commission,
Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, at http'/
europa.eu.int/comm/employmentsocial/soc-dial/csr/pdf 2/ 4 6-COMP BPUK_020104_en.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
104. See, e.g., Oxfam International, The European Commission's Green Paper: Promoting a
European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
employment-social/soc-dial/csr/pd f2/09 1 -NGOINTOXFAM_INT_02012 Ien.pd f (last visited
Apr. 5, 2005).
105. See, for example, the European Round Table of Industrialists' response at European Round
Table of Industrialists, ERT Position on Corporate Social Responsibility and Response to
Commission Green Paper, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/soc-diallcsr/pdf2/
043-COMPNETEUERTEU 011 122_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,2005).
106. See Response by Dr. Rosamund Thomas, Director of Centre for Business and Public Sector
Ethics, Cambridge, UK, to the European Commission on its Green Paper Promoting a European
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_
social/soc-dial/csr/pdf2/098-ACARosamund-ThomasUK_011208.en.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2005).
107. See U.N. Global Compact, supra note 93.
108. See International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422, 424-28 (Nov. 16, 1977).
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and standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of areas, including
human rights."9 Given the enormous amount of material produced to guide
corporate behavior, this move by the Commission attempts to set a baseline stan-
dard to which each company must adhere.
In support of these three documents and the uniform guidelines each sets
forth, the EU's Green Paper establishes uniform standards in critical areas and
eliminates the many compliance issues caused by the current lattice of private
compliance codes (MNC self-regulation), state-based codes (the French stan-
dard varies drastically from the English requirements), and industry-based stan-
dards (various international labor organizations have wide-ranging policies
regarding working conditions, for example). With the institution of the Green
Paper's general guidelines, MNCs will no longer be forced to question which
standards apply to an individual investment situation, nor will these corpora-
tions be able to pick and choose when to adopt standards and when to conve-
niently ignore them. While short of overt guidance, proxy support of these three
major documents is a worthy first step toward a comprehensive, uniform corpo-
rate compliance code.
Fourth, in perhaps its most important substantive message, the Green Paper
emphasizes the significance of consistent and uniform reporting mechanisms.
Given the importance placed on self-reporting by voluntary corporate compli-
ance codes generally, and reinforced in the language of the Green Paper, uni-
form reporting metrics, frequency, and depth of analysis must be required. The
numerous problems that exist in the current compliance code hodgepodge are
magnified by a lack of consistency among reporting requirements: "The multi-
plicity of incompatible benchmarking tools burdens companies with unneces-
sary costs and makes it difficult for them to reach their stakeholders through
reports that are clear and easily understood.""' The Green Paper makes a clear
case for the movement toward a global consensus in the type of information to be
disclosed in each report, the reporting format to be used, and the reliability of the
evaluation and audit procedure."'
109. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Declaration on Inter-
national Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 969, 970-72 (June 21, 1976).
110. Davidsson, supra note 9, at 537-38.
111. Promoting a European Framework, supra note 92, at 6, 18.
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C. The Failures
While the Green Paper's four major advancements are indeed steps in a pos-
itive direction, the document falls short in many critical areas. First, the standards
laid out by the EU's Green Paper are entirely voluntary. As the Council of the EU
points out, the code is intended to apply to behavior by businesses beyond existing
state-based legal requirements, which, the Council suggests, should continue to be
properly enforced.112 The Council's statement, while technically true (although it
seems to undermine the very aim of the Green Paper, which intends to establish a
uniform standard, not something that is to be tacked on to variable Member State
standards) is only applicable to MNC behavior within the boundaries of the EU.
Well-established international legal principles preclude extra-jurisdictional ap-
plication of EU and Member State law to activity occurring in other territory out-
side of the EU. In cases where European MNCs operate on foreign soil, these
corporations are not bound by the existing "legal requirements" to which the
Council Resolution refers. That said, the Green Paper addresses the primary issue
in the area of MNC regulation: compliance and enforcement of basic human
rights standards among MNCs faced with economic incentives and the pressure
of competing in profit-driven capital markets to do otherwise.
Neither media attention, public pressure, nor the threat of brand devalua-
tion 13 is strong enough to overcome the cost-benefit analysis driving the corpo-
rate machine. As Professor Paul Redmond states so precisely, "[t]he contest
between code compliance and firm profits is not an equal one. 114 In the worst-
case scenario, these voluntary codes will be completely ignored; in other situa-
tions, they will be selectively applied:
An ILO study of voluntary labor codes adopted by multinational
companies has concluded that there is both a tendency to be selective
in the inclusion of core ILO standards-less than 50% of the codes
112. Resolution of the Employment and Social Policy Council on CSR, 2002 O.J. (C 086) 3
(December 2-3, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/soc-dial/csr/
csr resolution.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
113. See Redmond, supra note 80, at 93-94 (discussing brand devaluation).
114. Id. at 94.
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reviewed included a clause on child labor-and a failure to develop
standardized monitoring practice or to ensure transparency. 115
In either case, this is an issue that must be addressed.
The second line of criticism is also tied directly to the evaluation of MNC
behavior outside the EU. While the Green Paper states that "[in a world of
multinational investment and global supply chains, corporate social responsibil-
ity must also extend beyond the borders of Europe,""..6 the Green Paper does not
place enough focus on regulation of FDI in general, and specifically in the con-
text of human rights. This issue would be more appropriately addressed directly
through the development of a specific set of human rights and labor standards
for MNCs operating outside the EU.117 Instead of developing unique internal
standards and definitions of individual responsibilities, and the logistical prob-
lems that would go along with these new standards, the EU would be better
served adopting existing internationally recognized standards, beginning with
the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and ILO."'
Third, the Green Paper is not specific enough in its suggestions for imple-
mentation of the code. Logistical considerations, including, but certainly not lim-
ited to issues concerning overall adoption, systemic implementation, and internal
and third-party auditory systems are almost entirely left out of the code. Given
that the Green Paper was intended to be a first step rather than a definitive guide-
line, these omissions are perhaps justified on some level. For this document to
achieve the level of success that its potential allows, these global standards must be
included in any further movement toward a controlling regulation.
115. Save the Children's Response to the EU Green Paper on 'Promoting a European Frame-
work for Corporate Social Responsibility,' § 2 (2001), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
employment-social/soc-dial/csrpdf2/91-NGOINTSave-the-ChildrenINT_011219_en.pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2005) (citing Janelle M. Diller, Director, Multinational Enterprises Depart-
ment, ILO, in presentation to RIIA Conference in Legal Dimensions of Corporate Responsibility,
Nov. 2001).
116. Promoting a European Framework,supra note 92, at 11-12.
117. See Allen White, Response to the Green Paper of Corporate Social Responsibility, Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI), at 2, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-socialsoc-dial/csr/
pdf2/031-ORGINTGRI Int_011024_en.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
118. See Amnesty International, Submission from Amnesty International on the European
Commission 2001 Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Respon-
sibility, Amnesty International, § 2.1, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employmentsocial/soc-dial/
csr/pdf2/091-NGOINTAmnesty-Internationalint01 1219_en.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
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The Green Paper represents an overt step by the EU to address issues of cor-
porate compliance on an institutional level. While admirable in its effort to raise
awareness, the Paper falls critically short in addressing the problem of corporate
responsibility outside of Europe, and as a result leaves human rights advocates
wanting more.
IV. THE GRASS IS "GREENER": A HYBRID SOLUTION
The civil liability model, made possible in the United States by the ATCA
and the Corporate Code of Conduct movement, exemplified by the EC's Green
Paper, can each be strategically altered by adopting successful principles from
each model in order to create a more effective regulatory tool in each forum.
A. Binding Codes for the EU
The primary weaknesses highlighted by the examination of the EU's Green
Paper concerned the code's voluntary nature. The Green Paper was intended to
serve as a supplement to existing EU and national laws, urging MNCs to volun-
tarily set higher standards in hopes of attracting socially conscious consumers
and investors, while appealing to the moral and social mandate of the EU itself.
The Commission must remember the original goals of the EU-the establish-
ment of a common European market and promoting free movement of labor
and capital between Member States. Certainly, free trade was promoted, in part,
to increase the economic power of the EU, as well as individual Member States
and European business interests. The incentive to draft legislation that strictly
regulates business interests is counterintuitive to this notion. Laws may exist, but
they are not strong enough. In addition to existing probusiness regulations, there
is clear disincentive to adopt time laden, labor intensive measures voluntarily.
Free market capitalism is a profit-driven principle: international organizations,
states, and MNCs aiming to succeed in this arena must appeal first and foremost
to a bottom-line ethos. In many cases, conducting business in foreign territories
governed by oppressive regimes increases an MNC's competitiveness. Increasing
costs to comply with optional codes, including the standards presented in the
Green Paper, does not square with this philosophy unless there are heavy penal-
ties that shift the cost-benefit analysis in favor of doing so. Damages awarded for
suits filed in EU courts against MNCs that have violated standards laid out in
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the Green Paper would serve exactly that purpose. In order to accomplish this,
the Green Paper standards must be binding.
Creating legally binding standards for MNCs within the EU would not de-
tract from the Green Paper's stated goal, nor would it be a drastic departure, at
least from a logistical perspective, from instituting voluntary codes. The institu-
tion of binding codes would involve, among other things, the development of a
penalty system and a public relations campaign intended to placate the corporate
interest. Neither of these issues is overly burdensome, especially for a bureau-
cracy as accomplished as the European Commission is at passing legislation.
There is little question that once a binding code with appropriate corporate in-
centives has been implemented, it would be much more effective in shaping cor-
porate compliance with basic human rights standards than the voluntary code
proposed by the Green Paper. Binding codes would force MNCs to adhere to
certain standards and prevent them from applying codes selectively, or from ig-
noring them altogether.
Developing binding codes for MNCs operating outside of the EU would be
a much more challenging and controversial undertaking for the EC. If the EU
is serious about promoting socially responsible corporate behavior, creation of a
binding code with potential liability for violation is a must. To that end, the doc-
trinal advancements-holding MNCs liable to foreign claims without a re-
quired showing of official state action-that have occurred in the United States
through ATCA litigation are invaluable as a point of reference. This standard of
liability should be solidified by the EC. This piece of legislation would create a
baseline standard to which MNCs must adhere, and avoid the inevitable gray
areas that develop as a result of litigation in a common law system. It also sends
a strong message: MNCs that have any involvement with foreign governments
committingjus cogens violations will open themselves up to heavy penalties.
With this baseline standard set in place, the EC must take steps to outline pol-
icies concerning MNC liability with respect to labor and human rights violations
falling short of thejus cogens definition. While binding regulations for these stan-
dards would be the most satisfactory solution for human rights advocates, the
costs to business interests and difficulties with implementation and regulation
render this option unfeasible. That said, the EC must state explicitly the expected
labor and human rights standards with which MNCs are required to comply
when operating in foreign territories. These standards should be identical to those
existing throughout Europe: minimum working conditions and age limits, for ex-
ample, should be the same in Nigeria as they are in Germany. ILO, UDHR,
JOSHUA M. CHANIN
ICCPR, and ICESCR definitions would be an ideal place to begin articulating this
policy. Uniformity, consistency, and regulatory schemes must be addressed in
earnest.
In brief, the EU must consider adopting American civil liability principles
in order to set a functional baseline of corporate compliance, both inside and out-
side of the EU. The threat of potentially huge civil liability will shift the cost-
benefit analysis in favor of adjusting human rights policies to meet thejus cogens
baseline. The Green Paper's voluntary scheme should be further developed to
include specific standards detailing corporate responsibility in the areas of
human rights and labor standards. By adopting existing international norms in
these areas, the EC would provide a lucid, easy-to-follow standard, which, given
proper regulatory and auditory mechanisms, would prove an effective tool for
both MNCs and human rights advocates.
B. Reworking the ATCA
It is clear from a basic analysis of ATCA litigation that Congress must be
called upon to act in order to correct basic problems that exist with the current
structure. While the effects of the current doctrine and its virtually limitless
MNC liability are positive from a human rights perspective and useful in shap-
ing corporate behavior in foreign territory, the ATCA doctrine, in its current
form, creates a number of problems. Apart from the "nightmare scenarios" that
have been forecasted, the law has proven difficult to interpret and even more
difficult to follow. Each circuit has developed its own set of tests and methods of
analysis, and in the process they have created a jumbled doctrine with few clear
principles or guidelines. Despite these shortcomings, U.S. federal courts have
been clear on one thing: MNCs are to be held liable forjus cogens violations com-
mitted by foreign regimes. As in the EU, civil liability along these lines should
remain possible in the United States, codified by a specific pronouncement from
Congress. The suggested legislation would benefit from construction similar to
the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA).l l9
The TVPA benefits from its explicit nature with respect to both the viola-
tions covered and the list of possible defendants; the new law must obviously ex-
119. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2000) (creating a cause of action
for foreign citizens for torture or extrajudicial killing committed by anyone acting under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation).
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pand the list of covered violations to include all jus cogens norms and specify
terms of corporate liability. The benefits of this legislation would be threefold.
First, the law would maintain the current level of pressure placed on corpora-
tions by the ATCA, resulting in increased MNC compliance and an improve-
ment in global human rights standards. Second, it would provide clear
guidelines for both MNCs and plaintiffs to follow. Third, it would appease the
Bush Administration and corporate America by limiting potentially frivolous
suits and the undue liability that necessarily results from this. As a top priority,
this legislation dealing with violations ofjus cogens norms for MNCs and other
defendants, should be among the first enacted.
Congress must develop a standard to address MNC liability for interna-
tional crimes that do not fall under thejus cogens umbrella-gross labor viola-
tions, torture, rape, and murder. The benefit of corporate liability for complicity
in the commission of these crimes is simply too great to eliminate a cause of ac-
tion entirely. Development of corporate requirements must be done to make the
standards truly effective as a method of shaping MNC behavior. While deliver-
ing justice to victims is positive,preventing corporate involvement in these viola-
tions altogether must be the law's ultimate goal. Congress must take measures to
outline specifics in two key areas: first, what crimes are to be included, 2 ' and sec-
ond, a clear definition of the applicable level of complicity in state action. 121
Similar to the approach concerning labor and human rights violations short
of an international crime suggested for the EU, the United States would benefit
from developing a binding code that standardizes expectations for corporate re-
porting and transparency of MNC policy, regardless of industry, internal, and
third-party auditory requirements.
CONCLUSION
The problem of reconciling basic human rights expectations in a world so
dominated by capitalism and its resultant profit-first ethos is extremely complex,
and made increasingly so by the movement toward a more integrated global
economy. With a reduction in the barriers to international trade and global busi-
120. Again, good places to begin include the UDHR,supra note 3; the ICCPR,supra note 15; and
the ICESCR,supra note 16.
121. The Doe VI standard has been suggested. That standard was derived from international
criminal law and rendered Unocal's mere knowledge enough to attach liability.
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ness, the increased movement of labor and capital, foreign direct investment,
and cultural exchange have created conditions in drastic need of regulation.
Each stakeholder in the global equation-intergovernmental organizations,
states, corporations, and NGOs-is attempting to develop individual schemes
that accomplish their own goals, be they focused on human rights or driven by
economics. Positive steps have been taken, both in the United States and in the
EU. Ultimately, however, concerted action is required. Real progress will only
be made when there is a collective realization that basic human rights for all
must neither be optional, nor be reduced to a factor in a cost-benefit analysis, but
must be rights that through the vehicles of social legislation and insightful, effec-
tive court decisions, are guaranteed to all. It is only after this realization that any
significant change will come about.
